State of Utah v. Richard H. Nickles And Margaret K. Nickles : Petition For Rehearing by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1984
State of Utah v. Richard H. Nickles And Margaret
K. Nickles : Petition For Rehearing
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Curtis C. Nesset; Attorney for Appellant
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Utah v. Nickels, No. 19221 (1984).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4142
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
-v-
RICHARD HATFIELD NICKLES AND 
MARGARET K. NICKLES, 
Defendants/Appellants 
Case No. 19221 
Category No. 2 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Petition for reconsideration of a decision by the Utah 
supreme court filed October 7, 1986 in an appeal from convictions 
and judgments imposed for aggravated arson, a felony in the second 
degree, and insurance fraud, a felony in the second degree, in the 
Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Peter F. Leary, presiding. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVE B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Appellant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
THE DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST 








TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886) . 
Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913) 
People v. Zimmer, 414 N.E. 2d 705 (N.Y. 1980) 
State v. Nickles, 43 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 1986) 
United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1984) . 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
rHE STATE Of UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
'iCHARD HATfIELD NICKLES AND 
MARGARET K. NICKLES, 
Defendants/Appellants 
Case No. 19221 
Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by the 
court on October 7, 1986. Originally this case was an appeal from 
convictions and judgments imposed for Aggravated Arson, a felony in 
the Second Degree, and Insurance Fraud, a felony of the Second 
Degree, in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, Presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant at 2-16. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), 
the Utah Supreme court stated the standard for the granting of a 
petition for rehearing: "To justify a rehearing, a strong case must 
:,e made>. We must be convinced that the court failed to consider 
nme naterial point in the case, or that it erred in its 
,_·unclusion.s, In Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P.619 at 624 
l'Jtah 1913), the Court declared: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions for 
rehearings in proper cases. When this court, 
however, has considered and decided all of the 
material questions involved in a case, a 
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we 
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or 
decision which may affect the result, or that we 
have based the decision on some wrong principle 
of law, or have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result . 
If there are some reasons, however, such as 
we have indicated above, or other good reasons, a 
petition for a rehearing should be promptly f 1led 
and, if it is meritorious, its form will in no 
case be scrutinized by this court. 
The argument section of this brief will establish that, appl~ 1 ~ 
these standards, the Appellant's petition for rehearing is prow 
before the Court and should be granted. Indeed, in its opin1oc, 
State v. Nickles, 43 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, (filed Oct. 7, 19861, 
(Addendum A). This court has misapprehended and overlooked isoc· 
of fact and law. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
IN PROSECUTING APPELLANTS' CASE WARRANTS A NEW TR Be 
In the opinion in this case his court held that if a 
defendant fails to move for disqualification of a prosecutor d. 
trial level, the defendant must subsequently demonstrate that 
actually prejudiced by the prosecutor's conflict of interest:; 
justify an order for a new trial on this "actual preJud1ce' sun 
is applied even if the defendant did not know, and had no :,,;sc· 
know, of the prosecutor's conflict at the time of trial. suci 
standard is impossible to meet and constitutes a dangerou 0 
diminution of a prosecutor's ethical and legal obligation~. 
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While it may be sound legal policy to require the actual 
preJudice standard on appeal in a case where the defendant knew or 
3,1 reason to know of the prosecutor's conflict at the time of trial 
:,, .. u.s. v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.c. Cir. 1981)], the standard is 
00und policy in a case in which the defendant could not be 
2 xpe··teJ to know of the conflict at the time of trial. 
Presumably, according to the opinion in this case, if a 
Jef~ndant had moved for disqualification at the time of trial, this 
court would apply an appearance of conflict standard on appeal. 
However, the Court's opinion expressed concern about a defendant who 
tries to take advantage of the system, to "become the unintended 
,beneficiary] of a rule that attempts to promote the public good." 
'.iickles at 25. Yet, this concern would only arise in a case in 
~nich the defendant knew, or had reason to know, of a prosecutorial 
conf:ict of interest at the time of trial, but failed to timely 
raise the issue, thus inviting error. The Court may fairly infer 
that a defendant who knows or should know of a conflict at the time 
of trial, but did not raise the issue, did not himself consider the 
P·Jtential for actual prejudice to be very great and has thus waived 
the issue. This is the situation described in U.S. v. Heldt, supra, 
' case cited by the court in support of the actual prejudice 
oldndard delivered in the opinion in this case. See especially, 
.~ at 1277, footnote 81. 
In Heldt, the defendant Church of Scientology claimed on 
·' l'l:eJ' t ·) t 'he f H st time that it was denied due process of law by 
'L•"''1ed prosecutorial conflict of interest. ~at 1275. The 
.i• JT • 11 'Jf Scientology had filed a civil suit against the U .s. 
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Attorney's Office prior to its criminal trial. Heldt at 1275 
church claimed that because two prosecutors were defendants in 
civil trial, they were self-interested in its outcome and thus 
not fairly prosecute the criminal charge. Id. The court nntc 
even though the church knew of the alleged conflict at the ti~. 
trial, it failed to raise the issue, along with other asserte, 1 
grounds, in its Motion to Disqualify, made at the time of t,, 0 
Heldt at 1277. The Court found the alleged conflict to be verc 
weak, basing this finding in large part on the fact that even· 
the defendants knew of the conflict at the time of trial, '[the 
conflict J was not at all a pp a rent, as evidenced by the fact tna: 
appellants never relied on it as a basis for disqualification.' 
1.£. Under these circumstances the Court held that when defencio:. 
have failed to move to disqualify on the ground of a conflict 
interest, yet assert a denial of due process on appeal, actua: 
prejudice must be shown to justify a new trial. Id. The hold:· 
.!i_eldt is limited to the situation where a defendant knew of t~e 
conflict at the time of trial, yet failed to raise it in his·'·,· 
to Disqualify. This is simply not the situation in the case"'· 
before the court. Neither the Nickles nor their attorney knew 
Christiansen's corporate involvement, or of his private busines: 
dealings with the insurance adjusting company that investigate: 
case or of the prosecutor's personal financial interest in plea-
that adjusting company, which investigated the Nickles f11e, _ .. 
November of 1982, some five months after the trial. (R. 2431 
short, neither the Nickles nor their attorney knew of ~he r 
degree of risk of actual prejudice that existed at the time 
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·rt~l until well after the Nickles were convicted. The court, 
l:cc·.ieve r, seems to have overlooked this crucial distinguishing 
, 11;iracteristic between the instant case and~· This is 
, ,,Jenced by the Court's statement that the "defendants failed to 
.,,,,;p 1n the trial court to disqualify the prosecutor and only now, 
"Jppeal, assert a denial of due process and equal protection." 
Nickles at 25. This comment by the Court, and its reliance upon 
Heldt appears to indicate that the Court believed that the Nickles 
knew at the time of trial of the conflict, yet failed to raise the 
,asue. As demonstrated, the record clearly shows that this is a 
~1sapprehension of fact. 
In the opinion in this case, the Court also cited Wright v. 
Jnited States, 732 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1984) as support for the 
adoption of the actual prejudice standard. The opinion quoted the 
following from Wright: 
[T]he degree of prosecutorial misconduct ... 
and the degree of prejudice to the defendant 
necessary to justify action by a reviewing court 
steadily increase as the case goes forward, with 
the least being required on a motion to disqualify, 
somewhat more on a pre-trial motion to dismiss an 
indictment, still more on a motion in the district 
court after conviction but before appeal, [and] 
somewhat more on a direct appeal. 
~l Jtah Adv. Rep. at 25 citing 732 F.2d at 1056 n.8. 
~0wever, the uncited remainder of the quote goes on to say ". 
'111d] a good deal more on collateral attack" Wright at 1056, 
~"''t1,ute 8. Appellants argue that taken as a whole, this quotation 
-1~urts the notion that cases should be reviewed on an individual 
•.13 tu ascertain the potential for actual prejudice based upon the 
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strength of the apparent conflict. Certainly, cases arise Whic• 
contain slight evidence of a conflict sufficient to disqualify 6 
prosecutor at the trial level but insufficient to cause an appe 
court to remand for a new trial. However, the issue in this c"c-
addressed by Wright, concerns the potential for actual prejudi:~ 
created by a prosecutor acting due to improper motivation to 
investigate, initiate, and try a case. Contrary to the assertLc 
the opinion in this case, Wright does not require a showing that 
defendant was in fact prejudiced by the prosecutor's conflict. 
Wright only notes that it is the better policy to require that 
risk the defendant was actually prejudiced be greater to just1f:.· 
order of a new trial on appeal, than is necessary to disqualify 
prosecutor at trial. Wright at 1056. The degree of risk, the 
danger that the prosecutor acted due to improper motivation, in 
effect, the potential for actual prejudice, is what should be 
considered by the court on appeal. This can be effectively 
determined by a facial evaluation of the nature of the conflict 
itself. 
A requirement that the defendant show actual prejudice 
appeal is, for practical purposes, an impossible standard to me;· 
The degree of risk that the prosecutor acted due to improper 
motivation, the possibility of actual prejudice, is all that ca· 
shown by a defendant. Indeed, in most cases, the sole source 0; 
information concerning a prosecutorial conflict is the prosec~t 
himself. A defendant and his attorney are at the mercy of the 
prosecutor concerning what is disclosed about such a conf l1ct. 
prosecutor may disclose as much or as little as he chooses reg': 
-6 -
the conflict. However, to believe that in most instances a 
prosecutor would admit to an improper motivation, risking both the 
prosecution and possibly his career, is surely the paradigm of 
naivete . Yet, in effect, this Court holds that absent such 
disclosure, a defendant has no remedy available on appeal, no matter 
how improper a prosecutor's conduct "appears.• The court thus 
shifts the entire risk of undisclosed actual prejudice to the 
defendant. 
In reversing the defendant's conviction because of the 
failure of the prosecutor to recuse himself due to an apparent 
conflict of interest, the New York Court of Appeals articulated the 
sound reasoning for adopting a "reasonable potential for prejudice• 
standard for appellate review of such cases: 
It would be simplistic therefore to think of 
the impact of a prosecutor's conflict of interest 
merely in terms of explicit instances of abuse. 
Even our thumbnail description of prosecutorial 
power is enough to indicate that resulting 
prejudice can at least as easily flow from an act 
of omission as from one of commission, from 
discretion withheld as from discretion 
exercised. In this context, whether abuse is 
express or implied may be difficult to 
determine. Suffice it to say that any 
presumption of impartiality tends to be 
undermined when there is a clear conflict of 
interest. Indeed, the judgmental nature of much 
of a District Attorney's conduct will put it 
beyond effective appellate revi7w. And, no . 
matter how firmly and conscientiously a District 
Attorney may steel himself against the intrusion 
of a competing and disqualifying interest, he 
never can be certain that he has succeeded in 
isolating himself from the inroads on his 
subconscious. 
[l] Thus, the practical impossibility of 
establishing that the conflict has worked to 
defendant's disadvantage dictates the ado~tion of 
standards under which a reasonable potential for 
prejudice will suffice. 
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Furthermore, the Court stated: 
It was important that these responsibilities, 
carried out in the name of the State and under 
the color of the law, be conducted in a manner 
that fostered rather than discouraged public 
confidence in our government and the system of 
law to which it is dedicated. This concern, that 
those occupying prosecutorial office be Jealous 
of the evidences as well as the substance of 
integrity, was not to be discounted. In 
particular, the District Attorney, as guardian of 
this public trust, should have abstained from an 
identification, in appearance as well as in fact, 
with more than one side of the controversy. 
People v. Zimmer, 414 N.E. 2d 705 at 707, 708 (N.Y. 1980). 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
This reasoning persuasively demonstrates that the adq· 
of an "actual preJudice' standard for appellate review of 
prosecutorial cases conflict severely diminishes safeguards fo· 
ensuring that the prosecutor meet his ethical and legal obl1ga'.. 
and dramatically increases the danger that defendants will oe 
unjustly prosecuted and convicted. Under the standard adopte~ 
thi:> court, a prosecutor who is so disposed can bring charges' 
prosecute to further his own personal interest, with little f2i· 
that a subsequent conviction will be overturned absent the d1Ec 
of "smoking pistol." 
In the instant case, the State conceded that "Michae: 
Christiansen should not have been the attorney to investigate. 
charges in and prosecute the defendants' case" Brief of Respon~ 
p. 41. Obvious.y, the State could not have reached such a 
conclusion unless it believed the potential for actual pre1•1.i: 
be high, not only at the time of trial, but at the time r'w 
investigated and charges were filed. However, the opinion 
-8 -
, 1 se assumed that the risk of actual prejudice was~ high because 
·.11 work performed by [Christiansen] on this case from the time of 
•ce Eire in October of 1980 until June of 1981, when he discontinued 
15 ~ssociation with AFI, was performed in his capacity as Deputy 
,cnty Attorney.• Nickles at 26. This conclusion assumes the very 
,,,,,,cion at issue--that because prosecutor, Christiansen said there 
~•• no involvement, there was no conflict of interest, thus no 
3ctual preJudice. Yet, given the inherent self-interest of the 
.~osecutor to conceal his actual motivation, the Court, like the 
~.f~ndant, can only examine the appearance of conflict. Despite 
prc~ecutor Christiansen's assertion that no conflict existed, (R. 
~483-841, the facts amply illustrate that the prosecutor's loyalties 
•ore divided. Indeed, at the time this case was investigated and 
:narges were filed, prosecutor Christiansen's AFI was an active 
business, soliciting new investigations and completing old ones. 
ender the Court's analysis in this case, the potential for preJudice 
at these critical stages of the Nickles prosecution was very high. 
While Christiansen's corporation, AFI, had apparently 
:eased most business activities at the time of the Nickles' trial 
R. 2486-87), the company was still a viable business entity with 
~1ke Christiansen at its helm. ( R. 2488). The risk of actual 
preJud1ce ended only when AFI was dissolved in December of 1982, 
-ell after the trial in this case. (R. 2488). 
Furthermore, it is at least possible, that at the time of 
' ' Christiansen retained strong personal interest in the future 
At the time of the Nickles' trial, AFI was still an 
-<cst1ng, viable corporate entity. (R. 2488). Christiansen was 
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still an officer. (R. 2488). The possibility of future busines: 
operations and Christiansen's involvement therein, was thus a 
distinct possibility. Indeed, the fact that Christiansen did n· 
dissolve the corporation until a year and a half after his su~> 
in the county Attorney's office ordered him to cease his invol 
(R.2488, 2491-92), evidences his hope of future business for Af 
Because the possibility of future business for AF! dt .. 
existed, Christiansen's motivation for attracting and mainta111.: .. 
potential sources of future income for AFI still existed. Gen': 
Adjustment Bureau, (GAB), the insurance adjusting agency that 
investigated the Nickles fire, was the same company that gave. 
the majority of its business. (R. 2464-71). Prosecutor 
Christiansen's motivation for pleasing GAB is thus obvious. Sc: 
nothing could please this source of past and future income mor' 
a successful prosecution on a half million dollar claim, of o -, 
GAB had vowed they were "out to get.• (R. 2523). 
The conclusion regarding the potential for actual ;'r 0 · 
is inescapable given these facts. Simply, at the time of u1a. 
prosecutor could well have entertained hopes of the continuea 
viability of his private company and have been motivated to p'. 0 : 
past and likely future substantial source of income for "hat 
company. The Nickles contend that this "apparent• conflict is 
significant enough to justify reversal even under the Wright 
"sliding scale" analysis. 
For the reasons discussed above, the better reaaoneo 
requires that a showing of reasonable potential for actual ~ 1 ' 
be adopted by this Court as the standard for appellate rev1•• 
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~, 05ecutorial conflicts of interest. Appellants therefore ask the 
n"rt to reconsider its standard requiring a showing of "actual 
rreiurl1cP" and remard their case for new trial, free from the risk 
·~' their case will be preJudiced by a prosecutor serving two 
CONCLUSION 
Because this court has overlooked critical issues of fact 
in~ law in this case and because the Court has delineated a standard 
•t ,__r, 1 s impossible to attain, the Appellants respectfully petition 
!~;" court to reconsider its decision in this case and reverse their 
: 0 nv1~t1ons and remand the case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this <f!!:.--day of November, 1986. 
~c~ 
CURTIS C. NESSE 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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C11c as 
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IN THE SVPREME COURT 
I OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I 
1 The STATE ol Lilah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
i '" 
I Richard Hatfield ~ICKLES and Margaret K. 
I ~ickles, 
' Defendants and Appellants. 
i 
I 'lo. 19221 
! FILED: Octob<r 7, 1986 
'THIRD DISTRICT 
Hon. Peter F. Leary 
Hon. James Sawaya 
1 A.TTORNEYS: 
1 Curtis Nesset for Defendants and Appellants. 
David L. Wilkinson, Dave B. Thompson for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
HOWE:, Jus1ice: 
Defendants Richard Hatfield Nickles and 
\1argaret K. N1cldes appeal 1heir convictions 
of aggra1,ated ar~on and insurance fraud. 
In the early morning hours of October 30, 
1980, \1,h1le defendants and their 1wo daugh-
ters. Kimberly and Diane, were on a tnp to 
Codc•Co 43 UT AH ADVANCE REPORTS 21 
California, an e,.;plosion and fire occurred at 
their home in Salt Lake County An in.,estlg· 
ation by the Salt Lake County Fire Depart-
ment and Arson Task Force (ATf) uncovered 
evidence of arson. Defendants were r,ubsequ-
ently charged with aggravated arr,on and 
insurance fraud. both second degree felonie'i, 
under U.C.A., 1953, §76-6-103 (1978) and 
§76-6-521 ( 1978), respectively n ey were 
found guilty as charged. Mr. Nickles was 
sentencecl lo 1 'o concurrent sent~nces of 011e 
to fifteen ".'e;:iro:; in the Utah State Prison. 
Mrs. Nicklf'.'i was given an identical sentence, 
but the coun placed her on probation. Both 
\\ere ordered 10 pay fines as well as restitu-
tion 
I. 
Defendants first contend that there was 
insu[ricient evidence to suppon the verdict of 
the jury. Our standard of review in this 
regard is \\ell established; we review the evid-
ence and the inferences to be drawn there-
from in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. S•are '" Dumas, 721 P 2d 502 !Utah 
1986): State >. McCardell, 652 P 2d 942 
!Utah 1982). 
Cause of fire 
Defendants maintain that reasonable doubt 
exists. as a matter of \a\.\-, whether the explo-
si0n and fire were arson caused, and that 
eHn if they were. whether defendants are the 
guilt~ panics. To pre1,ail on this contention, 
defendants must show that the evidence was 
rn insubstanua! or Inclusive that reasonable 
m1r.ds must ha\e entertained a reasonable 
doubt that they commmed the crime charged. 
Stare ' Dyer. 671 P 2d 142 !Utah 1983). 
Section 76-6-103 (1978), in effect at the time 
they were charged, provides that "!al person 
1s guilty of aggra\ated arson if by 'Tleans of 
fire or explosives he intentionally and unlaw-
f ull:. damages a habitable structure." The 
record reflects the evidence of an arson-
caused explosion and fire. 
Jn June of 19~0. several months before the 
fire, the fire marsha!l and captain of the 
Murray City Fire Department was asked by 
Mr. Nickles :o \'I Sit Com poster Corporation. 
a business operated by defendants. Mr. 
'.'J1ckles e'>pre">sed his concern that the opera-
tor~ of :m adpcent boa! manufacturing busi-
ness, .vho were experiencing financ1ai prob-
lems. might attempt to burn down their buil-
ding. In response to his question about what 
producl'i ~he bClat manufacturers might have 
in their posse~>ion to set fire~. the fire mars-
'iall told '.'Jick.les that !!quid acetone could be 
used. Although he made at least five subseq-
uent '- 1sits to f\lr. Nickles at Com poster 
Ccrporation during July and August, he 
reqified that he had not seen signs of an 
ongoing business at Com poster on any visit 
Several weeks later, on August 13, 1980. 
Composter Corporation borrowed $75,000 
from Capital Thnft & Loan The note wa, 
signed by defendants rndiv1dually and hy Mr 
Nickles as president of the corporation. Their 
home was mortgaged as 'ecurity for the loan, 
and according to defendants, the loan was to 
be paid out of the proceeds from its e.xpected 
sale. 
Defendants' home had been on the market 
at variom times during 1980. and at the time 
af the fire "Aas listed wtth one Ahce BlaJT, a 
real estate agent. who had listed the home on 
October l, 1980, for $239.000. She tes11ried 
that she had not shown 1he home nor did she 
have any potential buyers. and that defend-
ants had refused to give her a key, c!a1mmg 
that a complex burglar alarm system had 
been mstalled. Blair had also been unable 10 
schedule an open house, even on a weekend 
1 
defendants_ were going to be out of town, 
despite her repeated efforts w do so 
Defendants' home was ~overed by a "cad1-
llac" insurance policy which was increased 
from $165,000 to $250,000 in January of 
1980. This increase, made at their request, 
was to cover the refurbishing of their home. 
In early October of 1980, Mrs. Nickles 
secured a ''rider" for silverware in the 
amount of $17,280 which became effective on 
October JO, 1980. Before the date of the fire 
on October 30th, Mrs. Nickles, her daughters 
and the family's two dogs left for California 
Mr. Nickles planned to tly to Los Angeles for 
business meetings and then JOJO his family 1n 
Santa Maria. 
On the evening of October 28, Mr Nickle' 
telephoned a neighbor, Linda Dickert, and 
told her that he had a casserole he wanted to 
give her because he was leaving town al noon 
the next day. Dicken's founeen-year-old 
son, David, went over to pick up the casse-
role and found it sitting outside on a noYl"er 
box. He did not go inside the house. He 
noticed that one of defendants' cars was 
backed up in the driveway with the trunk 
opened, approximately ten feet from the 
door. Several days earlier, Mrs. Nickles had 
asked David to care for their cat while thev 
were away. She had on previous occasions 
given the Dickerts the key to the house; thi~ 
time, however, she placed the cat's food and 
bov.. Is on the porch outside the front door 
As Dickert ..,..as getting ready to go to bed. 
about 3:00 a.m. on October 29th, she noticed 
that lights v.cre on in nearly every room ol 
defendants' house. She did not notice anv 
movement or acuvuy. At the trial. she te'it1 
fied that she had heard defendants talk about 
acetone in connecuon with their business. 
that she had 'ieen a gallon container of 
acetone m their home, and that Mrs. Nickk~ 
had offered to lend. her some acetone, ,:la1-
f')r cumulative UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, see the i«ond stttlon of this ls.sue. 
22 43 UT AH ADVANCE REPORTS 
:ning, 1hat ">he had it b) the barrelfu! J Inasmuch as the jury beliCved that the fire 
had been arson caused, it 1s reasonable that it 
would also find from that same evidence that 
defend~nts committed the arson. Although 
the evidence connecting defendants to the 
~Ir N1i.:k\c<; 1.,.a.,, m Cahforn1a \~Ith his I 
1arn11} at the time he rece1\'ed a ca!I mfor-
rning hnn 1)1 :he explo'>lon and fire. They 
1 el urned to Sah Lake City on November 2, 
three d<J\"> later. In an intervie\"' with a ':>pec1al 
J~O"nt tnr /\ TF Jnd the Salt Lake County 
'-ir~cL1JI ·\r<.nn fire Enlorcement Unit, Mr. 
'.J1Lkle'> ;,t:ited that he had left for California 
11n \\.'cdne~daJ, Octoher 29, at 11:50 a.m. He 
nrl1ca1ed tha! on!" 1 w0 !ami\ies l<ne\~ cf his 
tr ,1\ 'i rlans and r..,cit no one hJd heen gne'1 a 
~,·1 1,, the house. He al<;o stated that cer!ain 
il·1:il'les h.:id heen removed from the house 
\.:e to ·~l'ncern<.. JCout a pos"Jble hurglary. 
n·rt'.1 -:c~t1ficatc<, ;iud rcrson.11 narcn had 
.J!~L' !:"C'e!l remO' ~'J rr'Jm lhe hou)e V,Hdt :rnd 
\tcrl1ng \!her had been placed in the \ault for 
\J!ekeep1ng During t!1at interview, Mr 
Nickles inquired ;is to \\hether a timing 
de\1ce had been found. Fire investigators 
\C'<;lified thJt :he} r.ad ob<;er\ed evidence of a 
fla1nrnatile liquid explosion. multiple points 
,11 lire l'fl)'.:.in. "pour patterns.~ and 'puddle· 
ucJ'> 1nd1cat1H of fire origin. A de ... 1ce cons-
1\11n(I of J hghl bulb embedded in a large 
amount of new:paper ash with an electrical 
'.o.ne running from the b;:ise of the light bult 
~ocket to 1n electrical outlet in the wall ·""·a<; 
found on the tloor if defendants' daughter, 
K1mherl\ ':; ba5cment bedroom. Also found 
1\cre 1r.,ilcro; leaCrng out of her bedroom 
1n1n rr · hal!wa\ The \\indcw .. and itc; frame 
111 i\1rnbe1 I~"' bedroom "'ere blown out. 
ln\e<;t1g;Hor<:. found .:.even.I acetone soaked 
'lll!i.:ao;e~ 11nder the qa1r"ay 1n the basement. 
Expert tc<;!Hno11~ :lt trial d1scloc;ed that the 
pour ranerm in ~he houst:. coupled with the 
melted steel on J ::>u, Joor, indicated that 
~larnrnal>le l1qu1d had been poured on the 
f\u(1r uf 'he hn11<;e before the fire. E'(perts 
,11<.ll te,;i1ieJ tt1at C"ploo;1on was not consis-
'L'll! 111!· :1 11.11ural ga'> e'p!osion, and was 
not 11\..eh cau<l'd h~ swamp g;:is. Finally, 
:xre~l~ •eq1f1cd that a '";\et-t:rpe'' exp!o~1on 
.t~"-OC1atcrl w11~ llJ.rr.m;ibk !1quids produced 
llVi\Jnt lire. Jnd 1de11t1f1ed che device found 
.1, one ,·0mmonly u'ed b) arsonists to ignite 
Ille\ 
The nrloq0r hmled f'!ass onto roofs and 
11~10 · •• :nds (1f 11earby hou<;es. \Vindo,,s "'ere 
lil(lll'l 
[ 1' l\ I ,,~ 
·•t1! 1n .1 r1t:1ghi>or'c; hou-;e, and the 
)l~u!h uf detendants' ''as 
'lni:!cd ~' 11,ime'> Firemen arrived \\llhin 
r11nu1e\ nt hc1ng \umrn0ned 10 fight the fire. 
'.~ l1 cn •lin :i.1r1\ed the h0me 1\t.1S engulfed in 
11.\111(, rhe tne ~\;l< \ef\ ho! and difficult to 
•''l111gu1\h 
1 he 1.....,r!:'~l'!ll.-= f.1..:ts rre<.ented o;ubstantial 
,,, kn1..e ·1h1l·h ('<;tJblished. bevcnd a reason-
1hlc .Jnubt. that the fire hJd been caused b~ 
M~n'l 
Guill of Defend:inh 
crime 1.<; primarily circumstantial, it is a well~ 
settled rule that circumstantial evidence alone 
may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the 
accusr-d. Stale \/, Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 
!Utah 1982); State v. Franks. 649 P.2d 3 
(Utah 1982); State > Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 
676 P'.2d JI, cert denied, 104 Suµ. Ct. 3592 
{1983); People v Pierce, 155 Cal. Rptr. 657, 
1
595 P.2d 91 (19791; State v. Brady, 2 Anz. 
App. 210, 407 P.2J 399 (19651 Circumstan-
llal evidence n ~d not be regarded as inferior 
evidence if it is of such quality and quantity 
as to Justify a Jury in determining guilt 
be)ond e reasonable doubt, and 11i sufficient 
to sustain a conviction. State v. Weaver, 637 
P.2d 23 (Mont. 1981). 
The jury couU'.1 reasonably infer the folio· 
wing facts from the circumstantial evidence 
presented at trial: the defendants were in 
serious financial trouble and made plans to 
burn down their house to solve their 
problem; that they increased the insurance on 
1 their house so the) would receive more 
j money from the policy; that Mrs. Nickels 
, refused to give the realtor a key because she 
\ v.anted to assist Mr. Nickles in setting the 
1 
house up for rhe fire; that she had lied about 
the burglar alarm system because she planned 
!O claim 1l on the proof-of.loss sraLement; 
that Mr. Nickles put the casserole outside 
because he did not want the neighbor's son m 
his house to observe the fire preparations: 
that Mrs. Nickles put the cat's food out on 
the porch and did not give the neighbor's son 
the key because she did not want the cat to be 
inside when the fire sta'.rted; that she took the 
family dogs with her to California for the 
same reason; that the lights were on at 3:00 
a.rn. because Mr. Nickles was setting the fire; 
and finally, that defendants took their time 
returning from California because they were 
not shocked or surprised by news of the fire. 
If the jury concluded that each defendant, 
either directlv committed the defense or aided 
in its commi-ssion, the verdict must be susta-
ined. The jury had before it considerable 
circumstantial evidence from which it could 
have concluded that defendants committed 
arson, either directly in the case of Mr. 
Nickles, or indirectly by aiding and assisting, 
in the case of Mrs. Nickles. 
Insurance Fraud 
Oefrndants also contend that there was 
insufficient eYidence to support the jury's 
\ erdict finding them guilty of insurance 
fraud. On December JO, 1980, two months 
after the fire, defendants submitted a proof-
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j ev idenc_e_t_o-su_p_p_o_r_t -t-he_v_e-rd-1-ct_fi_n_d_tn_g-de-'f"'e-of-loss statement to their insurance carrier. 
The statement listed approximately 1700 
items and claimed $233,35].29 for the house. 
5134,000 for contents. $53,600 for loss of 
use, $12,876 for 51\ver. $3,800 for furs, 
$6,500 for landscape, and $360 for other 
structures 
Insurance adjusters assigned to the case 
testified that numerous items of the greatest 
value were not found in the remains of the 
fire, and that, at best, only 500io of the items 
claimed by defendants in their proof-of-loss 
statement were located. lmesugators with the 
Salt Lake Countv Attorney's Office were 
unable to verify purchases of several major 
i1ems, including the sterling silver purportedly 
purchased at ZCMI, and other items allegedly 
purchased by defendants and claimed in their 
proof-of-loss statement. 
Defendants assert that their submission of 
an insurance claim which may have included 
inaccurate estimates of value does not aJone 
constitute fraud. We concede that it does not; 
however, under UC.A., 1953, § 76-6-521. 
we note that the jury, without addressing the 
accuracy of the submitted estimates, could 
easily find t!'lat defendants did commit insur-
ance fraud Section 76-6-521 provides: 
Every person who presents, or causes 
to be presented, any false or fraudu-
lent clairr., or any proof in support of 
any such claim, upon any contract of 
inrnrance for the payment of any 
!ms, or ""ho prepares. makes or 
subscribes any amount, certificate of 
survey, affidant or proof of loss, or 
other ~ook, paper or writing, with 
intent ·o present or use the same, or 
to allow lt to be presented or used, in 
siJpporl )f any such cllirn is punish-
atile as in the manner prescribed for 
theft of property of like value. 
The plans submitted w the insurance 
company for reconstruction of defendants' 
house included, among other things, an inte· 
rcom system and a burglar aJarm system, 
neither of \lo'hich had been m the home prior 
to the fire. [n fact, at lhe trial, Mrs. Nickles 
testified tha~ the house did not hav:: a burglar 
alarm system or an intercom system. From 
the evidence presented at trial. it is clear that 
defendants, despite the diff1cuH conditions 
under which :hey were required to prepare 
their proof-of-loss statement. presented a 
false or fraudulent claim" to their insurance 
:ompany Even 1f the Jury had chosen to 
disbelieve the testimony of fire invesugators 
as to items thev v. ere ur.able to !ocat~ or 
ident1f) in :he ~ubble, the undisputed evid-
ence that defendants claimed a nonexistent 
burglar a.Jarm system and intercom system on 
their proof-of-loss statement is suflicient 
I ndants gu1hy of insurance fraud. A determ1-
I nation of whether their cla.Jm was excessive 
on other items 1s unnecessarv inasmuch as the 
defendants did submit a fraudulent claim 
intentional!y misrepresenting the ex1qence of 
these two items See Srate v. Kitchen, 564 
P.2d 760, 763 (Utah 1977). 
II. 
Defendants next contend that evidence of a 
telephone caJI received by an employet of 
ATF approximately three weeks after the fire, 
from a caller purporting to be Mr. Nickles, 
was inadmissible because there was no authe· 
ntication or identification of the caller. It is 
well established that communications by tele-
phone are admissible in evidence where othe-
rv.1sc relevant to the facts and issue. 29 Am. 
Jur. 2d Evidence §380 (and cases cued 
therein). The 1dcnuty of a caJJer may be esta-
blished by circumstanual evidence. Unaed 
States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022 (1979): 
Grogan v. Uniceci Scates, 394 F 2d 287 ilth 
Cir 19"67); Srace v. Peele, 54 N.C. App. 247, 
282 S.E.2d 578 (1981). Further. 1f the party 
calling, in addition to a statement of his 
identity. relates facts and circumstances 
which, taken with other established facts, 
tends to reveaJ his idenmy. the conversation 
IS admtSsible. Scace v. Marlee, 94 Idaho 803, 
498 P.2d 1276 (1972); 29 Am. Jur. 2d EVJde-
nce § 384. Herc, both requirements were 
satisfied At the tnaJ, the following testimony 
was given by Ela.me Rice, a secretary for 
ATF: 
Q: At the time that you received the 
call from the person calling, dtd the 
person calling identify himself? 
A: He identified himself to be himself 
a Dick Nickles, yes. 
Q: Yes. 
Q· Did the person purporting to be 
Mr. Nickles have any further conver-
sation with you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: If you would, to the best of your 
recollect1on, descnbe or state what 
the person purport mg to be Mr. 
Nickles or Mr. Dick Nickles stated to 
~ou dunng the course of the convers-
ation. 
A: He was asking about some arncles 
thar had been removed from his home 
and then mentioned to me that there 
had been a suspected arson at his 
home and that he had been suspec· 
for cumulatht UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, wt lhr second SKlJon of 1hiJ iHut. 
!led} of it and commented that wasn't 
It lucky he had been 800 miles a"ay 
v.1th the Secretary of the Department 
of Energy and that he -would have 
needed a very long fuse or a time 
delay 
Then, ~e again came back to the 
f <Jct that rhese articles 1\ere missing 
and r asked what Y..as missing and he ' 
said some sil.,.erware and 01her things, 
whole drawers full. And I told him I 
didn't belie\e we had them and that 
he <;a1d po\sibly they had been 
remo\ed f0:- safekeeping. 
l !o!d him that I d1dn·t think we 
had 1hcm. but that I 111ould have [the 
1n\est1gacorj call v.hen he got back to 
rhe tJffice 
J f v.e ~'amine Lh1s :omersation in light of 
1he rrmc1ples stated abo•e. 1t 1s clear thar the 
·.~s11monv of Eileen Rice reveals that the 
.:a!ler 1denufied himself as Mr. !'lickles. 
rurther. he offered 1n!ormat1on to the empl-
("1\CC that onlv he or ~cmeone in his family 
1\ould ha.,.e known. Although certain infor-
matH"l11 rer1a1ning to the fire had been made 
rubhc b~ 1he media. there is nothrng in the 
record to contrO\ er' 1he logical inferences to 
lie d1a .... n from this 1nform:Hton. i.e., that the 
cJller w1s in fact .\t1r ~ickles. Defendants 
·elv nn Srate ~ ,\far/a, supra, 10 support 
the phorie call imo evidence. 
Ill. 
Defendants' third contention is that they 
were denied their right to a fair trial due to 
the individual and cumulative effect of evid· 
ence which they claim was inadmissible 
because it was irrelevant or immaterial. Rule 
40 I. ' lTtah R. Evid., defines •relevant evid-
ence" as "evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequerice to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." At the trial. 
defense counsel objected. among other 
things, to the admission of the neighbor's 
testimony concerning the lights being on in 
defendants' home in the early morning hours 
of October 29, as well as evidence pertaining 
to other accellerants, the amount of insurance 
coverage on the property, and the proximity 
of defendants' business to a thrift store. 
We cannot find that the lower court abused 
its discretion by admiuing this evidence. Even 
if some of these admissions had been error, 
in light of the other evidence presented at 
trial, it would be harmless error in that there 
1s no reasonable likelihood in the absence of 
this evidence there would have been a diffe· 
rent result in defendants' trial. See State v. 
Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982). 
·h~ir co.Hent1on that the lO\\er court should IV. 
not h:t\-:" admitted the '.elephone call into Defendants next contend that the trial 
~,,.1dence \\'e rind their reliance to be m1spl- courr failed to properly instruct the jury on 
J~t:d Although the court m that case deter- the elements of insurance fraud by refusing 
mined that a mere statement of his identity to give their requested Instruction No. 14. 
h..,. the caller is insufficient proof of the call- That Instruction included, as an element to be 
er·5 :d::nr1t\. · 1t also acknowledged that proved for conviction of the crime of insur-
1..c)rrohorar,,-n of a s1atement of tdenuty by ance fraud, that the jury must find that defe. 
:he <:aller ~ufficten1 !O render the comersauon ndants submitted values for items on their 
Jdmirnble .lga1mc him may be supplied by proof-of-loss statement which were intentiO· 
n 1dence that the sub;cct matter of the call nally excessive, not just merely inaccurate. 
re' e~kd rhat onh· the named party would estimates of value. They claim that this defi-
l1Hh have k;iov.ledge of those conversational ciency may have confused the jury to the 
fJcrs. N ::>f other confirming circumstances extent that it reached a guilty verdict without 
11h1..:h make 11 prol1able that the named sufficient evidence of criminal conduct. We 
oero;;on '.\a~. in ract. the <;peakcr · Id. at 1281 find this contention to be without merit. The 
l(1ta11ons omitted; emphJs1s added). court's Instruction No. 21 adequately differ· 
In St.ire • ,'-{am1Jton. 18S i\1ont. 522, 605 entiates between intentional fraud and reaso· 
P 2d J !21 1 !9801 . .;at. Jenu:d . .J.J7 U.S. 924, nable error in the submissions of estimates of 
'.he \foncana Supreme Court no:ed: value. That instruction reads: 
The c0mple:eness of the identificarion You are instructed that an act comm· 
'..'c'eo;; to the 1\etght of the evidence itted or an omission made under 
;,l!hcr rh;::rn co its admissibility, and ignorance or a mistake of fact which 
<he resron~1b!l1ty lies in che firsr inst- disproves any criminal intent is not a 
Jnce 1\11h ;he Drstricf Court to deter- crime. Thus a person is not guilty of a 
.111ne v.1th1n !t< c;ound discreiion crime if he acts under an honest and 
1\hether the !hre<;hold of adm1rnbility reasonable belief in the existence of 
ha<; n:ot:"n met certain facts and circumstances 
IJ Jt 1 l.::'.S (citation 01 rntted). We find no which, if true, would make such an dt°'u~e o1 discretinn here, and find that the act or an omission lawful. If you find 
!'.'1\er (OUT' rrorerlv Jdmit!'!d testimony of that rh~ defendants, or either one, 
f<ir LT \H CODE ANNOTATIONS, SH the second 1«tJon of 1hls lst11e .. 
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because of a reasonable mistake, 
made certam claims upon an insur-
ance company be/Jeving such claims 
to be uue to the best of h1s knowl-
edge, then you must find him not 
gu1/ty of insurance fraud 
(Emphasis added.) As we noted above, defe-
ndants' intention to submu a fraudulent 
claim 1s clear from the undisputed evidence 
that they claimed a nonexistent burglar alarm 
svstem and intercom system. Thus, the court 
Properly instructed the jury on the elements 
of insurance fraud. 
v. 
Defendants' final contention 1s that they 
are entitled to a new triaJ because there was a 
conllict of interest on the part of the deputy 
county anorney assigned to prosecute this 
case. Earlier, we remanded this case to the 
trial court for supplemental proceedings on 
the issue of prosecutorial misconduct. Defe-
ndants moved the court for a new trial based 
on the evidence presented at that heanng 
The trial court denied their motion, finding 
among other things, that ~the case was tried 
and convictionlsl obtained upon evidence and 
facts developed and found upon investigation 
of the Salt Lake County Fire Department and 
not AF!." 
The prosecutor had been employed by the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office since 
!9 .. 6. In 1979. he began prosecuting arson 
and insurance fraud cases. and received trai-
'"'·:ng in arson and insurance fraud investiga-
tion from the National Fire Academy. In 
June or July of 1980. the Salt Lake County 
Auorney's Office was a recipient of a federal 
grant co establish a countywide arson task 
~orce, and he became the lead prosecutor for 
that group (A Tf) The full task force investi-
gated the fire at defendants' home. He, along 
with other task force personnel, reviewed this 
case for possible cnmmal charges. 
The fire at defendants' home occurred 
October 30, 1980. In late March of 198 I, 
approximately five months later, the prosec-
uror along .,, uh his wife and one other indiv-
idual formed a private corporation called 
Arson and Fraud Investigation (AFI) which 
was designed to provide JObs in arson invest-
igation for •he several employeoes of the 
County Attorne) 's Arson Task Force who 
had been nottf1ed that their posiuons would 
terminate as of Jul) I, 1981. AF! performed 
eight investigations in Idaho, Wyoming, and 
L'tah, and he personally participated in many 
of thee'! 1mest11zations. He did nol advise the 
Salt LJke C.Ju;ry Attorney about lhe incorp-
oration of AF! In June of 1981, when the 
Salt Lake Cc1 un!y ,"-.ttorney became aware of 
ltS e.1(istencc, he asked the prosecutor to disa-
ssociate himself from the business. AF! 
I 
I 
terminated its business operat1om by Septe· 
mber of 1981 and filed Articles of Dt<:.~oiu­
tion on December 8, 1982. Thus, the prosec. 
1 utor had been uninvolved in the operation~ of 
AFI for approximately one year by the time 
defendants "'ere. brought to trial in June ol 
1982. 
U.C.A., 1953, §67-16-4(4). provides that 
~no public officer or public employee shall 
[ajccept other employment which he might 
expect would impair his independence ot 
judgment in the performance of his public 
duties." A public prosecutor who 1s involved 
with a corporation that mvesllgates poss1bk 
arson and insurance fraud C3.5es for insurance 
companies should not aJso be represenung the 
state in the prosecution of s1m1lar cases. This 
would appear to be a conflict of interest. The 
pivotal issue here, however, becomes whether 
in this instance, defendants were entitled to a 
new tnal because of an apparent conflict of 
interest. 
The State cites Wnght v Unued States, 
732 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1984), where the 
Court of Appeals advocated a scaled appr-
oach to the review of prosccutonal conll!ct ot 
interest claims. Specifically, 1t stated that: 
[T]he degree of prosecutonaJ miscon-
duct ... and the degree of prejudice to 
the defendant necessary to jusufy 
acuon by a reviewing court steadily 
increase as the case goes forward, 
with the least bemg requ1red on a 
motion to disqualify, somewhat more 
on a pretrial mouon· to dismiss an 
indictment, still more on a motion in 
the district court after conviction but 
before appeal, [andj somewhat more 
on a direct appeal .... 
Id. at !056 n. 8. 
It is clear that a prosecutor should be d1sq· 
ualified on a timely motion when he has a 
personal conflicting· interest in a case. Here, 
however, defendants faded to move in !he 
triaJ court to disqualify the prosecutor and 
only now, on appeaJ, assen a denial of due 
process and equal protection. Jn these circu-
mstances. we must requue that defendants 
prove actual prejudice. United States ¥. 
Heldt, 668 F 2d 1238, 1277 (0.C. Cir. 1981), 
cen denied. 456 U.S. 926 (1982). Defendants 
have made no showmg of actual pre1udicc 
To the extent that defendants might receive 
relief from the prosecution solely on " 
showing of potential preJud1ce, they would 
become the undeservmg beneficiaries of a 
rule that attempts to promote the pub!K 
good. As we noted above, the business of 
AFI terminaled its operauons in Septembrr 
of 1981; defendants were not brought to trial 
unul June of 1982. Any confl1c1 the prosec-
utor had between AFI and defenC:ants' case 
had been severed long prior to the trial. All 
for cumulative VT AH CODE A:"'i!NOTA TJONS, 'Jtt lhe sttond 5ttl.loa ol 1hl! issue. 
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work performed by him on lhis case from the 
urne ol t 11e fire in October of 1980 until June 
of 1981, when he jiscontmued his association 
with AFI, was performed in his capacity as 
Deputy Ccur1ty Attorney. AFI played no part 
in the in· ... est1gation Defendants correctly 
note that the same prosecutor's misconduct 
caused reversal of an earlier arson conviction 
by this Court in Scace v. Troy, 688 P 2d 483 
{Utah 1984). Howe\'er, the facts requiring 
reversal in that case, i.e., the ina~propriate 
comments made by the prose:::utor during 
opening and closing statements, are not anal· 
ogous to the conflict of interest issue prese-
nted here. Absent a showing of actual preju· 
dice which the defendants were unable to 
make, we find no error ""hich would justify a 
new trial, and the lower court properly 
denied their morion. 
Convictions affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall. Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
1. This Rule is comparable in substance to 
former Rule 1(2). Utah R. hid. (1971); the 
former Rule. in effect at the trial in this 
action, defines "relevant evidence~ as that 
having a tendency to prove or disprove the 
ex.istence of any ,, material fact." The 
applicanon of former Rule I (2) by this Court 
in Scace ,, Peterson. 560 P 2d 1387 (Utah 
t 977), is harmonious with the new language. 
